The theaterization of military commands and operational synergy within national security agencies are two other lessons that must be put into practise in order to counter the growing threat of religious radicalization, cyberwarfare, and espionage from enemies, in addition to Pakistan's ongoing perfidy.
On this day in 1993, the Indian Armed Forces proclaimed victory after pushing the Pakistani regular army and Islamist mercenaries from the Kargil heights.
Many people have spoken out against Pakistan's treachery, which included tossing the Lahore Declaration into the trash in February 1999 and allowing its army to cross the Line of Control (LoC) in the Mushkoh-Drass-Kargil-Batalik sectors with the intention of cutting off the supply line to the southern Siachen Glacier and occupying Indian territory in the Ladakh sector. The audacious military strategy of then-Pakistani Army General Pervez Musharraf and his chief of general staff Mohammed Aziz, who is currently being treated in a hospital in Dubai, was based on the assumption that the Indian Army, led by then-Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, would not retaliate as this could result in a full-fledged nuclear conflict between the two newly declared nuclear weapon states. The international community, which was then led by a friend of Islamabad,
The then-PM Vajpayee invited the then-Pakistani dictator Gen Pervez Musharraf (who overthrew PM Nawaz Sharif in a military coup in October 1999) for a bilateral dialogue at Agra in July 2001, while the gallant Indian officers and soldiers of the Indian Army and force multipliers of the Indian Air force and the Indian Navy wrested every inch of territory on the glaciated heights of Kargil from the Pakistani intruders with their blood. To the dismay of the Left-Liberal media, the NDA leadership insisted primarily on talking about the cross-border terrorism coming from Pakistan and refused to budge on Jammu and Kashmir, which led to the humiliating failure of the negotiations. The pro-Pakistan media has promoted all of the proposals for Jhelum, Chenab, and the soft LoC at
The main external lesson from Kargil, which the Indian leadership has frequently learned and unlearned over the previous two decades, is that Pakistan sees India as its eternal enemy. The most important internal lesson was the urgent requirement for mechanisms to foster cooperation and teamwork among the three branches of the Indian Armed Forces. Remember that the Indian Air Force (IAF) only joined the Kargil conflict one week after the Indian Army did because it required particular cabinet authorisation. The aircraft carrier, the main weapon of the Indian Navy, was being maintained throughout the Kargil War, and ironically, it is still being maintained now.
Despite extensive discussion on the subject, the military has not yet accepted jointmanship and continues to pose questions.public commentary on the small-scale combined theatre commanders. Even though the national security planners have internally considered integrated battlegroups and cold start wars, the theatrization of commands is in jeopardy since a portion of the high brass feels that India should have a single command because it is one theatre. In this perspective, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh's announcement that India will have combined theatre commands of the three services last Sunday in Jammu at a ceremony honouring Kargil soldiers is crucial because it sets the tone for upcoming military changes. The announcement of the unified theatre commands in the nation's 75th year of independence would be appropriate.